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Embodied simulationWhen people interact, affective information is transmitted between their brains. Modern imaging techniques
permit to investigate the dynamics of this brain-to-brain transfer of information. Here, we used information-
based functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate the ﬂow of affective information
between the brains of senders and perceivers engaged in ongoing facial communication of affect. We found
that the level of neural activity within a distributed network of the perceiver's brain can be successfully
predicted from the neural activity in the same network in the sender's brain, depending on the affect that is
currently being communicated. Furthermore, there was a temporal succession in the ﬂow of affective
information from the sender's brain to the perceiver's brain, with information in the perceiver's brain being
signiﬁcantly delayed relative to information in the sender's brain. This delay decreased over time, possibly
reﬂecting some ‘tuning in’ of the perceiver with the sender. Our data support current theories of
intersubjectivity by providing direct evidence that during ongoing facial communication a ‘shared space’ of
affect is successively built up between senders and perceivers of affective facial signals.Neuroimage Nord, University
y.
S. Anders).
nse.© 2010 Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY license.Introduction
Exchange of information between brains is essential for successful
human interaction. Interaction partners must continuously update
information about their partner's inner state, intentions, motivation
and affect, in order to anticipate the other one's behaviour and to
adapt their own behaviour accordingly. Onemechanism that has been
proposed to play an important role in exchange of affective
information between individuals is ‘embodied simulation’ (Gallese,
2003; see also Lipps, 1903; Adolphs et al., 2000; Decety and Jackson,
2004; Bastiaansen et al., 2009; Iacoboni, 2009). The idea is that when
people observe another person's affective behaviour, their facial
expression, gesture or movement, this automatically activates a
‘mirror’ representation of the other person's affect in the perceiver's
brain. In other words, experiencing and perceiving affect are thought
to activate similar neural networks, creating a ‘shared space of affect’
between senders and perceivers of affective information.
A number of neuroimaging studies have found evidence that is
consistentwith the idea that ‘embodied stimulation’ plays a role in the
exchange of affective information between brains. For example, it has
been shown that when volunteers observe another person receiving apainful stimulus they activate part of a ‘pain network’ that is also
activated when the volunteers themselves receive a painful stimulus
(Morrison et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2004; Botvinick et al., 2005). Other
studies provide evidence that a region in the anterior insula is
recruited both when people experience disgust and when they
observe another person experiencing disgust (Calder et al., 2000;
Wicker et al., 2003). More generally, it has been suggested that
observing a facial expression of affect activates part of a somato-motor
network that is also activated when volunteers express their own
affect (Carr et al., 2003; Leslie et al., 2004; Hennenlotter et al., 2005;
van der Gaag et al., 2007).
However, it has to date remained unclear whether these networks
indeed carry similar affect-speciﬁc information in the sender and
perceiver. Moreover, if ‘embodied simulation’ plays a role in the brain-
to-brain transfer of affective information, then there should be a
temporal succession of information in these networks from the sender
to the perceiver. These temporal dynamics can only be studied by
comparing brain processes in two individuals engaged in ongoing
affective communication. We used information-based functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) (Haxby et al., 2001; Haynes and
Rees, 2006; Kriegeskorte et al., 2006; Norman et al., 2006) to directly
investigate the dynamics of the ﬂow of information between the
brains of senders and perceivers engaged in facial communication of
affect. First, we aimed to identify a ‘shared network’ of affect that
carries similar information in both the sender and the perceiver that is
speciﬁc to the emotion that is currently being communicated. Second,
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information from the sender's brain to the perceiver's brain.
Methods
Participants
Because it has been suggested that exchange of affective informa-
tion is strongest between closely attached individuals (Singer et al.,
2004), we investigated the ﬂow of affective information between
romantic partners. Six different-sex couples (mean age of women
22 years, range 20 to 25 years, mean age of men 24 years, range 22 to
28 years) who had been engaged in a romantic relation for at least one
year at the time of scanning (mean 2 years, range 1 to 4 years)
participated in the study. All participants were right-handed and
reported no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. Partici-
pants gave their written informed consent prior to participation and
the study was approved by the local ethics committee.
Experimental design
Partners were invited together to the scanning facility. After a
brief introduction, they were informed that they would be scanned
simultaneously and that the perceiver would see the sender's facial
expression online during scanning via a video-camera. Partners were
then separated and the female partner was informed that her task
would be to indulge herself into emotional situations and to facially
express her emotional feelings as soon as they arose. The female
partner was selected as sender because women have been shown to
be more accurate senders of affect than men (Buck et al., 1974).Fig. 1. Experimental design. Senders and perceivers participated in 10 runs of fMRI. Colours
fear, or sadness), grey indicates resting periods. The order of runs was chosen by the sender
occur a second time. The sender's facial expression was video-taped throughout scanning and
had been completed.Particular care was taken to ensure that the sender understood that
she was not meant to pose emotional expressions but to try to share
her emotional feelings with her romantic partner as they arose. The
male partner was completely uninformed about the sender's task
and was simply asked to watch the senders' facial expression and to
try to feel with her (i.e. the male partner did not know that the
sender was asked to submerge herself into emotional situations,
please see Supplemental online material for the wording of the
instructions). In fact, the sender's facial expression was videotaped
throughout scanning and shown to the perceiver when he was
scanned in the same scanner immediately after scanning of the
sender had been completed.
Scanning consisted of ten runs; each run comprised four 20 s-
periods during which affective information was to be communicated,
and ﬁve interspersed periods during which the sender was instructed
to relax (24 s, 22 s, 18 s, 22 s, and 18 s) (Fig. 1). A single emotion (joy,
anger, disgust, fear, or sadness) was used in each run in order to avoid
rapid switches between conﬂicting emotions. A single printed word
(e.g. ‘joy’) signalled emotion periods to the sender. The order of
emotions was chosen by the sender, with the restriction that no
emotion could occur twice in a row and that each emotion had to
be chosen once before an emotion could be chosen a second time.
Please note that the perceiver was uninformed about the timing
within runs.Data acquisition
Ninety-two (92) functional images covering the whole brain were
acquired during each run (T2*weighted echoplanar images, 1.5 Tesla
Siemens Avanto, Erlangen, Germany; tilt angle −30°, 64×64 matrix,indicate emotion periods; each colour indicates a different emotion (joy, anger, disgust,
with the restriction that each emotion had to be chosen once before an emotion could
shown to the perceiver while he was scanned immediately after scanning of the sender
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thickness 6 mm with no gap, TE 40 ms, TR 2000 ms). An fMRI-
compatible video camera (Wild et al., 2000) was used to video-tape
the sender's facial expression throughout scanning. Additionally, we
recorded skin conductance responses (SCR) as a peripheral index of
autonomic activity during scanning with standard commercial
recording equipment (Varioport, Becker Meditec, Karlsruhe,
Germany). Details of skin conductance data acquisition have been
described elsewhere (Anders et al., 2004). Stimulus presentation and
data collection were synchronised with Presentation software
(Neurobehavioral Systems Inc., Albany, CA, USA). After each run,
perceivers were asked via the intercom what they thought the sender
might have been feeling, and if they thought that they had felt the
same as the sender, and responses were protocolledword-by-word by
one of the experimenters. Skin conductance responses and verbal
reports served to conﬁrm that participants showed emotional
engagement during emotion periods. No explicit emotion recognition
data were collected in order to avoid subject priming.
Analysis of behavioural data
Usable SCR data were obtained from three senders and ﬁve
perceivers. Data of the remaining individuals could not be analysed
due to recording errors. For analysis, linear trends were removed from
the time series of each run, and the average level of SCR during the
20 s-emotion periods was contrasted the average of a 4 s rest period
before the onset of each emotion period.
Word-by-word protocols recorded after each run were used to
derive a measure of emotion recognition accuracy for each run.
Emotion recognition was parameterized as '1' if the perceiver
correctly named the sender's emotion, or gave a description that
was correctly identiﬁed by two independent raters, and '0' otherwise.
Chi-Square statistics tested for differences in emotion recognition
between emotion types.
Analysis of fMRI data
Preprocessing of functional images included slice acquisition time
correction, concurrent spatial realignment and correction of image
distortions by use of individual static ﬁeld maps (Andersson et al.,
2001), normalization into standardMNI space (Montreal Neurological
Institute) and spatial smoothing (10 mm Gaussian kernel) (SPM5,
Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK).
Voxel-wise classiﬁcation analysis
Previous studies have shown that levels of activity within a
distributed network of brain regions differ, depending on the
individual's affective state (e.g. Damasio et al., 2000; Phan et al.,
2002). Thus, to identify a ‘shared network’ for affective information
we searched for voxels where the level of emotion-speciﬁc activity in
the sender's brain was reﬂected in the perceiver's brain. For this
purpose, we ﬁrst computed an image of voxel-wise parameter
estimates for each emotion period (i.e. each trial) using a general
linear model as implemented in SPM5. This resulted in 40 parameter
estimates (4 trials per run×10 runs) for each voxel and participant. To
prewhite data for the classiﬁcation analysis, the global mean was
subtracted from each image and the 40 parameter estimates for a
given voxel were normalized to zero mean and unity across all
emotion periods.
Classiﬁcation analysis was carried out separately for each voxel.
First, in a given voxel, mean values were computed across the eight
parameter estimates of each emotion (4 trials per run×2 runs per
emotion) for the sender (‘Training’). Second, thesemean values were
used to classify the perceiver's brain activity. The perceiver's brain
response in a given emotion period was classiﬁed according to the
smallest distances between the perceiver's brain response and thesemean values (‘Test’) (Fig. S1 Supplemental online material). This
approach is similar to a univariate k-nearest-neighbour classiﬁcation
except that classiﬁcation is based on the nearest mean value instead
of k nearest neighbours. This yielded a total of 40 binary
classiﬁcation accuracies per voxel. To derive a single measure of
decoding accuracy per voxel for each sender-perceiver pair, voxel-
wise classiﬁcation accuracies were averaged across all trials.
For group statistical inference, the images of voxel-wise decoding
accuracies were subtracted with chance level (p=.20), spatially
smoothed (10 mmGaussian kernel) to allow for Random Field Theory
statistical inference (Worsley et al., 1996), and fed into a one-sample
T-test with random factor subject as implemented in SPM5. The
resulting statistical parametricmap (SPM) tested the H0 that decoding
accuracies were not greater than chance. Because previous work has
shown that single voxels carry limited information only and that
information is be encoded in extended brain regions (Pessoa and
Padmala, 2007) we used a voxel-wise height threshold of T=3.3
(corresponding to a probability of false positives of p=.01) and
assessed statistical signiﬁcance at cluster level (p=.01, corrected for
multiple comparisons according to Random Field Theory [Worsley
et al., 1996]; this corresponded to a minimal cluster size of 100 con-
tiguous voxels). Please note, however, that the number and location
of clusters was highly stable across different height thresholds.
Time-resolved classiﬁcation analysis
Next, we sought to investigate the temporal dynamics of the ﬂow
of affective information from the sender's brain to the perceiver's
brain. Particularly, we were interested whether early information
from the sender's brain was encoded early in the perceiver's brain,
and late information from the sender's brainwas encoded later in the
perceiver's brain. This would indicate that there was a temporal
succession in the ﬂow of emotion-speciﬁc information from the
sender's brain to the perceiver's brain. For this purpose we used a
time-resolved multivariate decoder. As before, a classiﬁer was
trained on the sender's brain activity and tested on the perceiver's
brain activity. However, the time-resolved classiﬁcation analysis was
based on intensity values in single functional images. After
preprocessing, global means were removed from each image and
voxel-wise intensities were normalized as described above. Func-
tional images were then temporally alignedwith respect to the onset
of an emotion period. This resulted in 40 time series (10 runs×4
emotion periods per run) of 18 functional images per subject, each
covering a 36 s-time interval from 2 scans before the onset of an
emotion period to 6 scans after offset of the emotion period.
Because we were interested in the temporal dynamics with
which information in voxels known to carry emotion-speciﬁc
information (i.e. the ‘shared network’) was transferred from the
sender to the perceiver we aimed to restrict the analysis to these
voxels. To avoid circularity, we identiﬁed voxels that carried
emotion-speciﬁc information separately for each sender–perceiver
pair, based on data from the remaining sender–perceiver pairs only.
Thus, for each sender–perceiver pair the most signiﬁcant 2500
voxels in the group SPM derived from the remaining sender–
perceiver pairs were selected (corresponding roughly to the number
of above-threshold voxels in the voxel-wise analysis).
For classiﬁcation, the intensity values of these voxels within a 2 s-
time window (corresponding to one functional scan) were repre-
sented as a vector in m-dimensional space, where m is the number of
voxels. Classiﬁcation was based on Euclidian distances between
vectors. First, for each 2 s-timewindow,mean vectors were computed
across the eight intensity vectors of each emotion (4 trials per run×2
runs per emotion) for the sender (‘Training’). Second, these mean
vectors were used to classify the perceiver's brain activity. The
perceiver's response in a given 2s-time window was classiﬁed
according to the smallest Euclidian distances in m-dimensional
space between the perceiver's response and these mean vectors
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perceiver's brain activity was carried out separately for each time
window of the sender's brain activity and each time window of the
perceiver's brain activity, and separately for each emotion period. This
yielded a total of 40 binary classiﬁcation accuracies for each
combination of time windows. To derive one measure of decoding
accuracy for each combination of time windows, classiﬁcation
accuracies were averaged across all emotion periods. This resulted
in an n-by-n matrix of time-resolved decoding accuracies for each
sender–perceiver pair, where n is the number of time windows. Each
row of the time-resolvedmatrix of decoding accuracies represents the
time course fi(pi) with which information from the sender's brain in a
speciﬁc 2 s-time window si was encoded in the perceiver's brain.
To extract the dynamics of information ﬂow from the time-
resolved matrices, time-resolved matrices were ﬁrst temporally
smoothed with a ﬁlter width corresponding the time course of the
hemodynamic response function (4s×4s Gaussian ﬁlter). Then, time
courses were averaged across all time windows si and this average
was subtracted from each individual time course. This resulted in a
new n-by-n matrix for each sender–perceiver pair. For each time
course f′i(pi) in this new matrix we determined the time window pimax
in which information from the sender's brain in time window si was
most accurately encoded in the perceiver's brain [i.e. f′i(pimax)=max(f′i
(pi))]. To test whether there was a temporal succession in the ﬂow of
information (i.e. whether there was a positive linear relation
between time windows si and pimax) we used a linear contrast
within a repeated-measures ANOVA with ﬁxed factor time window
of the senders brain activity and random factor subject. Because we
were mainly interested in the ﬂow of affective information, the
ANOVA was restricted to the time interval covered by the expected
time course of the hemodynamic response during the affective
communication period (i.e. from 2 scans after beginning of an
emotion period to 2 scans after the end of an emotion period). The
delay between information in the sender's brain and information
in the perceiver's brain for a given time window si was deﬁned as
pimax−si. A linear contrast within a repeated-measures ANOVAwith
ﬁxed factor time window of the senders brain activity and random
factor subjectwas used to test for changes of delay over time. Average
group matrices and time courses are shown for visualisation (Fig. 3),
but analyses of the time course of information ﬂow were carried out
separately for each sender–perceiver pair and statistical analyses are
based on data of individual sender–perceiver pairs.
Supplemental analysis
As stated above, all of the above analyses were carried out within
true sender–perceiver pairs. To test the possibility that the ‘shared
network’ carried information in individual sender–perceiver pairs
that was speciﬁc to each sender–perceiver pair and that exceeded
information that was present in all senders and perceivers, we
performed an additional analysis that compared classiﬁcation accu-
racies within true sender–perceiver pairs to classiﬁcation accuracies
within arbitrary sender–perceiver dyads. To this end we combined
information across all m voxels in the shared network as described
above. However, because this time we were not interested in the time
course with which information was transferred, vectors in m-
dimensional space now represented m parameter estimates as in
the ﬁrst analysis (rather than m intensity values from single
functional images). Because we reasoned that information that was
speciﬁc to speciﬁc sender–perceiver pairs would vary across trials we
performed a separate classiﬁcation analysis for each trial. First, a
vector was computed for each trial for the sender (‘Training’). The
perceiver's response in a given emotion period was then classiﬁed
according to the smallest Euclidian distance in m-dimensional space
between the perceiver's response and the ﬁve vectors representing
the sender's emotion-speciﬁc response during the corresponding
trials (‘Test’). This resulted in 40 classiﬁcation accuracies for eachsender–perceiver pair. We then repeated the same analysis, this time
pairing each sender with each perceiver except her true communi-
cation partner, and each perceiver with each sender except his true
communication partner. To derive one sender – other-perceivers
classiﬁcation accuracy for each sender, and one other-senders –
perceiver classiﬁcation accuracy for each perceiver, classiﬁcation
accuracies were averaged across perceivers and senders, respectively.
To avoid circularity, voxels that carried emotion-speciﬁc information
were identiﬁed separately for each sender–perceiver pair, based on
data from all remaining sender–perceiver pairs only.
Results
Skin conductance and emotion recognition
Average time series of skin conductance responses of senders and
perceivers are shown in Fig. S3 Supplemental online material. In both
senders and perceivers SCR increased during emotion periods
(senders, .63±.07 μS [mean±s.e.m.]; perceivers, .09±.02 μS; all
participants, T(7)=2.6, pb .05; perceivers only, T(4)=3.9, pb .01).
This indicates that affective communication led to an increase of
autonomic arousal. Furthermore, in line with the assumption that the
perceiver's autonomic response reﬂected the sender's autonomic res-
ponse over time, visual inspection of the time series indicates that the
increase in perceivers was delayed relative to the increase in senders.
Perceivers recognized the sender's emotion in 70 percent of the
runs. Recognition rates were highest for joy (1.00) and lowest for
anger (.50), but recognition was above chance (.20) for each and
every type of emotion (binomial pb=.05 for all types of emotion),
and there was no statistically signiﬁcant difference in recognition
rates between emotion types (Chi-Square=2.5, df=4, pN .50, Fig. S4
Supplemental online material).
A shared network of affect
First, we aimed to identify brain regions where the perceiver's
brain activity could be predicted from the sender's brain activity,
depending on the speciﬁc emotion that was currently being
communicated. For this purpose we trained a simple univariate
classiﬁer to identify the sender's current emotion based on the level of
activity in a given voxel in the sender's brain, and tested whether the
same classiﬁer could identify this emotion from the level of activity in
the same voxel in the perceiver's brain. This procedure revealed that
the perceiver's emotion-speciﬁc brain activity could successfully be
predicted from the sender's emotion-speciﬁc brain activity in a
distributed network, including temporal, parietal, insular and frontal
brain regions (Fig. 2 and Table S1 Supplemental online material). In
other words, these brain regions carried highly similar information in
the sender's and perceiver's brain, and this information was encoded
by highly similar signals in the sender's and perceiver's brain.
Dynamics of information ﬂow
Next, we sought to investigate the temporal dynamics of the ﬂow
of affective information. Particularly, we were interested whether
early information from the sender's brain was encoded early in the
perceiver's brain, and late information from the sender's brain was
encoded later in the perceiver's brain. This would indicate that there
was a temporal succession in the ﬂow of emotion-speciﬁc information
from the sender's brain to the perceiver's brain. For this purpose we
used a time-resolved multivariate decoder. As before, a classiﬁer was
trained on the sender's brain activity and tested on the perceiver's
brain activity. However, this time the classiﬁer was trained on the
sender's brain activity in all voxels of the shared network within a
speciﬁc 2 s-time window and then tested on the perceiver's brain
activity in another 2 s-time window.
Fig. 2. The ‘shared network of affect’. A. Clusters in which the perceiver’s brain activity could successfully be predicted from the level of the sender’s brain activity, depending on the
communicated affect (p=.01, corrected for multiple comparisons at cluster level). Signiﬁcant clusters are projected onto the surface of a standard brain (MNI). B. Average voxel-
wise decoding accuracies within each cluster, projected onto axial slices of the same brain as in A. Slices are shown in neurological convention (left is left). Numbers below slices
indicate z coordinates.
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(Fig. 3A) represents the time coursewithwhich information from the
sender's brain in a speciﬁc 2 s-time window was encoded in the
perceiver's brain. Initially, these time courses all appear highly
similar (Fig. 3B). This would suggest that brain activity within the
shared network was speciﬁc to each emotion but did not change
much over a given emotion period. Importantly, however, the
temporal dynamics of information ﬂow became visible when the
average time course (i.e. the stationary component) was subtracted
from each individual time course. This revealed that the accuracy
with which information in the sender's brain in a speciﬁc time
windowwas reﬂected in the perceiver's brain was not stationary, but
changed in a systematic manner over time. Early information from
the sender's brain was most accurately encoded in the perceiver's
brain at early time points; and late information from the sender's
brain was most accurately encoded in the perceiver's brain at later
time points (T=2.2, pb .05, one-tailed, Fig. 3C).
Fig. 3D also shows that there was a considerable delay between
information in the sender's brain and information in the perceiver's
brain. The bar chart shows, for each time window, the delay with
which information from the sender's brain was reﬂected in the
perceiver's brain. This delay was large (up to 8 s) just after the
beginning of an affective period and decreased towards the end of an
affective period (close to 0 s) (T=−3.6, pb .05, two-tailed). Please
note that this delay cannot be explained by the latency of the
hemodynamic response because time courses of information ﬂow
were computed from fMRI signals of the sender and the perceiver
and the hemodynamic delay is thus a common component to both
signals.Speciﬁcity of information within the shared network
As additional analysis, we tested whether the ‘shared network’
carried information in individual sender–perceiver pairs that was
speciﬁc to each sender–perceiver pair and that exceeded information
that was present in all senders and perceivers (Fig. 4). Speciﬁcally, we
tested whether classiﬁcation accuracies within true sender–perceiver
pairs were higher than classiﬁcation accuracies within sender – other-
perceiver dyads and within other-sender – perceiver dyads. This was
indeed the case. Classiﬁcation accuracies were still above chance for
sender – other-perceiver dyads (mean accuracy=.29, T=10.1,
df=5, pb .001) and other-sender – perceiver dyads (mean accura-
cy=.29, T=5.9, df=5, pb .001), indicating that similar information
was present in all senders and perceivers. Critically, however,
classiﬁcation accuracy was signiﬁcantly lower within sender –
other-perceiver dyads than within true sender – perceiver pairs
(paired T-test, T=2.3, p=.03) and signiﬁcantly lower within other-
sender – perceiver dyads than within true sender – perceiver pairs
(paired T-test, T=2.4, p=.03). This provides clear evidence that the
shared network does not only represent ‘prototypical’ emotional
information but indeed carries information about a communication
partner's individual affective state.
Discussion
In sum, our data show that during ongoing facial communication
of affect, emotion-speciﬁc information is encoded in similar
distributed networks in the sender's and perceiver's brain. Further-
more, there is a temporal succession in the ﬂow of affective
Fig. 3. Dynamics of information ﬂow. Each row of the time-resolved matrix of decoding accuracies (A) represents the time course (B) with which information from the sender's brain
in a speciﬁc timewindowwas encoded in the perceiver's brain. Subtracting the average from these time courses reveals the temporal dynamics of information ﬂow (C). Time courses
of delta accuracy in C are scaled to the overall maximum of delta accuracy. Red lines indicate the peak of each individual time course; dashed lines and numbers on the right indicate
the time window the sender's brain activity was taken from. The bar chart (D) shows the delay with which information from the sender's brain was reﬂected in the perceiver's brain.
Dark grey bars in C and D represent an approximation of the interval covered by the predicted time course of the hemodynamic response during affective communication.
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information in the perceiver's brain being delayed relative to
information in the sender's brain. These ﬁndings extend existing
knowledge on the neural basis of affective communication in two
important ways.
First, we show that distributed anterior temporal, insular and
somato-motor brain regions that have been associated with
‘embodied simulation’ during affective communication not only
show common activity during emotion observation and ﬁrst-hand
emotional experience (Wicker et al., 2003; Carr et al., 2003; Leslie
et al., 2004; Hennenlotter et al., 2005; van der Gaag et al., 2007), but
indeed carry emotion-speciﬁc information in the sender and
perceiver. Moreover, our data show that this information is encoded
by highly similar signals in the sender and perceiver. This can beseen from the fact that information about the speciﬁc emotion that
was communicated by the sender could be decoded from the level of
activity in individual voxels within this network in the perceiver's
brain even though the decoder was trained on the sender's brain
activity only. Thus, our analyses provide evidence for a ‘common
coding’ of emotion-speciﬁc information in a distributed network in
the sender's and perceiver's brain. Interestingly, the ventral
premotor cortex, which is often activated when people imitate or
observe posed affective facial expressions (Carr et al., 2003; Leslie
et al., 2004; Hennenlotter et al., 2005; van der Gaag et al., 2007), was
not part of this network.
Second, our approach allowed us to directly measure how
information from the sender's brain is subsequently encoded in the
perceiver's brain. Thus, we could show that there was a temporal
Fig. 4. Speciﬁcity of information within the ‘shared network of affect’. Bar charts
represent average classiﬁcation accuracies when information was combined across all
voxels within the ‘shared network of affect’. Classiﬁcation accuracy was signiﬁcantly
lower within sender – other-perceiver dyads and other-sender – perceiver dyads than
within true sender–perceiver pairs. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
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tion from the sender's brain being encoded early in the perceiver's
brain, and later information from the sender's brain being encoded
later in the perceiver's brain. This illustrates that information from
the sender's brain was dynamically reﬂected in the perceiver's
brain.
A very recent study by Schippers et al. (2010) used a design similar
to that in the current study except that senders in that study did not
communicate their affective state, but gestured arbitrary words to the
perceiver. Using between-subject Granger causality analysis that study
showed that changes of activity in certain regions of the sender's brain
preceded changes of activity in other regions of the perceiver's brain.
The current study supports and extends those ﬁndings by showing that
information about the speciﬁc content of communication (in this case
the sender's affective state) from the sender's brain is subsequently
reﬂected in the perceiver's brain.
Notably, there was a considerable delay between information in
the sender's brain and information in the perceiver's brain. This
delay (up to eight seconds) was much longer than it would be
expected due to the very brief physical delay of the video signal or
neuronal transmission delays in low-level motor and sensory
systems in the sender and perceiver. Also, delays were computed
directly from the sender's and perceiver's fMRI signal and thus
cannot be explained the latency of the hemodynamic response. At
ﬁrst glance this result seems to be at odds with behavioural studies
that have shown that covert mimicking reactions to facial and bodily
expressions of emotion can occur very rapidly (e.g. Dimberg and
Thunberg, 1998; van Heijnsbergen et al., 2007). However, the
ﬁnding that it may take several seconds until the sender's affective
state is fully reﬂected in the perceiver's brain is in line with the view
the human emotions comprise different response components (e.g.
Anders et al., 2009) that unfold over time (Leventhal and Scherer,
1987). Interestingly, the delay between information in the sender's
brain and information in the perceiver's brain decreased over an
affective period. This possibly reﬂects some ‘tuning in’ of the
perceiver with the sender. In other words, while it may initially
take some time for the ‘shared space’ (Gallese, 2003) of affect to
build up between the sender and perceiver, information transfer
seems to become faster once the shared space has been established.
Finally, our data provide evidence that the ‘shared network’ does
not only carry ‘prototypical’ emotional information but indeed
carries information about an interaction partner's individual affec-
tive state. This can be derived from the ﬁnding that classiﬁcation
accuracies within the shared network were higher within true
sender–perceiver pairs than within arbitrary sender–perceiver
dyads. This underlines a possible role of the ‘shared network’ in
simulating another person's current affective state rather than in
solely reﬂecting prototypical information.The current study, like most previous studies, investigated
‘embodied simulation’ during facial communication in a context in
which perceivers were biased to share the sender's affective state. In
real-life situations this might not always be the case. In certain
contexts, situational demands might lead to an inhibition of
‘embodied simulation’ (e.g. Lamm et al., 2007). The current study
provides a tool to directly study such inﬂuences by assessing the
amount of speciﬁc information that is reﬂected in the perceiver's
brain, depending on the context.
One important question that has to be considered when inves-
tigating a possible role of ‘embodied stimulation’ in social interaction
is how such a mechanism might be implemented at the neuronal
level. A seminal ﬁnding in this regard was the detection of neurons in
the macaque area F5 (a premotor area) that ﬁre not only when
the monkey performs a goal-directed hand movement, but also when
the monkey observes the same action being performed by another
individual (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996). This and
subsequent ﬁndings have been taken as evidence that ‘mirror
neurons’ (i.e. neurons that ﬁre during observation and action) might
link third-person observation and ﬁrst-hand experience and thereby
provide an important basis for insightful social interaction (e.g.
Gallese, 2003). The search for such ‘mirror neurons’ in the human
brain has been restricted by the limited spatial resolution of recording
methods available for human research. Nevertheless, along with a
single record of a ‘mirror neuron’ for pain in the human brain
(Hutchison et al., 1999) there are a number of studies that have shown
that some regions in the human brain respond during observation and
execution of speciﬁc actions (Iacoboni et al., 1999; Shmuelof and
Zohary, 2006; Dinstein et al., 2007; Gazzola and Keysers, 2009;
Schippers et al., 2009), or observation and ﬁrst-hand experience of
affect (Wicker et al., 2003; Carr et al., 2003; Leslie et al., 2004;
Hennenlotter et al., 2005; van der Gaag et al., 2007). However, there is
an ongoing debate whether common activity in neuroimaging studies
indeed reﬂects the existence of ‘mirror neurons’ in these regions.
Alternatively, observed and executed actions, or observed and ex-
perienced affect, could be represented by different subpopulations of
neurons within the same region (Morrison and Downing, 2007;
Dinstein et al., 2008; Lingnau et al., 2009). The current study shows
that affective information is represented in similar neural networks in
the sender's and perceiver's brain, and that affective information
within these networks is encoded by highly similar signals. It will
remain a challenging task for future studies to examine the neuro-
physiological bases of this information transfer below the current
resolution of neuroimaging studies.
In conclusion, our data support current theories of intersubjectiv-
ity by showing that affect-speciﬁc information is encoded in a very
similar way in the brains of senders and perceivers engaged in facial
communication of affect. Information is successively transferred from
the sender's brain to the perceiver's brain, eventually leading to what
has been called a ‘shared space’ of affect (Gallese, 2003). At the same
time, our approach extends the individual-focussed approach of
previous neuroimaging studies on the social cognition to a dyadic,
inter-individual perspective. Previous studies have examined how
common stimulation synchronizes brain activity of individuals
(Hasson et al., 2004), and have investigated brain responses of
individuals involved in ongoing social interaction (King-Casas et al.,
2005; Tognoli et al., 2007), but have not directly studied how activity
in one individual's brain inﬂuences, or depends on, activity in another
individual's brain. However, to understand the neurobiological bases
of social interaction it is fundamental to understand how the brains of
individuals interact. The approach presented here, using information-
based imaging to directly compare brain activity of individuals en-
gaged in ongoing social interaction, provides a tool that might open a
new perspective in social neuroscience that seeks to examine the
neurobiology of human social behaviour from an inter-individual
point of view.
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